

Regional Update on the Americas Collective NGO Written Statement

This statement has been prepared in consultation with a wide range of non-governmental organizations, including those led by forcibly displaced and stateless persons.

Regional overview

The Americas is going through one of the most complex moments in terms of forced displacement since comparable records began. There were 9.7 million people living in internal displacement in 2024¹, a notable increase from 6.3 million in 2023, with most displacements associated with conflict and violence. The combination of generalized violence, organized crime, protracted political crises, armed conflicts and disasters is placing significant pressure on those forced to flee and on national and international protection systems. By mid-2025, 4.3 million asylum-seekers and 980,000 recognized refugees had been registered.² While several States have advanced regulatory frameworks and strong asylum traditions,³ many systems need to be strengthened and adapted to the new realities, and to reaffirm States' commitment to international protection. **Strengthening the capacity of States in the region to provide asylum and complementary protection is a necessary solution for those who require protection, and an opportunity for development for the region.**

Key dynamics and causes of displacement in the region

Displacement dynamics in the region continue to be multiple and overlapping, with children, especially the unaccompanied, among the most affected groups: one in four refugees and migrants in the region is a minor.⁴ These patterns include internal displacement caused by conflict, violence and organized crime, mixed movements across diverse migration corridors, deportations, involuntary returns and disaster displacement.

At the regional level, the absence of robust frameworks to protect internally displaced persons leaves thousands without safe alternatives. Increasingly, hundreds of displaced people, who were initially heading north, decide to seek asylum in countries where they are in transit, such as Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras. This occurs even when these countries do not guarantee full security conditions, as those who flee do so to protect their lives and avoid the threats they face in their places of origin.

¹ [2025 Global Report on Internal Displacement \(GRID\)](#), Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 13 May 2025

² [Mid-Year Trends 2025](#), UNHCR, 4 November 2025.

³ In accordance with international standards, the concept of asylum must also include the recognition of refugee status.

⁴ [Number of unaccompanied and separated children migrating in Latin America and the Caribbean hits record high](#), UNICEF, 5 December 2024.

The land route through the Darien to the north has seen a drastic decrease in traffic, with fewer than 3,100 crossings recorded in 2025, in contrast to more than 800,000 crossings in the previous two years.⁵ This decline does not necessarily reflect a reduction in protection needs, but rather changes in migration control and containment policies that have displaced people towards less visible and more dangerous routes. Closing or restricting land corridors does not eliminate displacement, but rather reshapes it, increasing the risks of trafficking, violence and deaths in transit. Such as, for example, the increase in maritime routes, both through the Caribbean and the Pacific, from Panama to Colombia. These reverse flows have become extremely dangerous and continue to be a cause for deep concern not only because of the risks they imply, but also because of the scarcity of safe routes for protection and integration at destination.

In country-specific situations, the multidimensional crisis in **Haiti** continues to force hundreds of thousands to flee without adequate protection mechanisms. In 2025, the number of displaced people in the country reached 1.4 million.⁶ We note with concern the deportations from the Dominican Republic, including of children, pregnant women, and Dominicans of Haitian descent.⁷ Without progress towards a sustainable solution to the persistent violence and recurrent impacts of disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes, the population will continue to be displaced within and outside the country. After more than a decade of crisis, communities continue to face conditions that deepen their vulnerability and severely limit their access to essential services. Likewise, the severity of gender-based violence has deepened: by July 2025, the GBV Subcluster recorded 6,269 incidents - an increase of 7% compared to the previous year - of which 47% corresponded to rape, and among these, 62% were committed collectively, evidencing the extreme level of risk faced by especially women, girls, and adolescents.⁸ In this context, children face increasingly serious barriers to accessing and staying in education. Violence has established itself as one of the main barriers for displaced children and adolescents, and its impact intensifies with increasing age. Adolescents, in particular, are exposed to increased risks of recruitment, threats and attacks by criminal gangs and armed groups, further restricting their educational opportunities, safety and holistic development.⁹

In **Honduras**, widespread violence and disasters continue to drive displacement. In the first nine months of 2025 alone, nearly 21,000 people were displaced,¹⁰ including nearly 9,000 directly as a result of violence, adding up to more than 100,000 people already in

⁵ [El paso de migrantes por la selva del Darién se redujo un 99 % en 2025, según el Gobierno de Panamá](#), CNN en Español, 1 January 2026.

⁶ [El desplazamiento en Haití alcanza niveles récord mientras 1,4 millones de personas escapan de la violencia](#), OIM, 16 October 2025.

⁷ [Haiti: 'I Was Deported to a Country I Have Never Lived in'](#), Antonie Lemonnier, 3 February 2025.

⁸ [Análisis Regional de Protección en América Latina y el Caribe durante el 2025, R4V](#), 17 November 2025.

⁹ [Análisis Regional de Protección en América Latina y el Caribe durante el 2025, R4V](#), 17 November 2025.

¹⁰ [Desplazamiento interno en Honduras Enero a septiembre de 2025](#), ReliefWeb (Source: NRC), 3 February 2026.

displacement as of 2024.¹¹ At the same time, around 43,000 Hondurans were deported from the U.S. and Mexico in 2025, a 25% increase from 2024.¹² Many of them had already been internally displaced before crossing borders and continue to fear for their safety upon return. In a recent study by ProLAC,¹³ 9 out of 10 internally displaced people in Honduras expressed fear of facing threats to their safety if they returned to their place of origin.

Ecuador also faces widespread violence that has resulted in mass displacement. At least 300,000 people have been internally displaced between 2023 and 2025, according to UNHCR.¹⁴ The country is home to Venezuelans (almost half a million) and Colombians in need of international protection, who are also sometimes forced to move again as a result of the violence in Ecuador. We recognize the country's initial efforts to respond to and protect vulnerable persons, although we stress that specific laws are needed to address the phenomenon of internal displacement and ensure the protection and assistance of the population. According to a study by ProLAC¹⁵, three-quarters of displaced families go into hiding, breaking ties with their communities; half restrict their movements for fear of reencountering members of organized criminal groups; a third lose their income and the ability to support themselves, deepening poverty. Minors pay the highest price. Many drop out of school to avoid forced recruitment, extortion, threats to their lives, or the risk of sexual violence in or on their way to school.

Meanwhile, armed conflicts in **Colombia** continue to cause new displacements, confinements and humanitarian needs, adding to the more than 7 million displaced people since the conflict began.¹⁶ At the end of 2024, the conflict in the Catatumbo region intensified, and since then at least 100 thousand people have been displaced, thousands more confined without the possibility of moving freely, limiting entire communities from accessing food, water, health services or education. At the national level, in 2025 alone, the Humanitarian Response Plan registered 1,000,000 people affected by mobility restrictions, and 96,400 people victims of mass forced displacement.¹⁷ The Forum of Humanitarian NGOs, in its annual estimate made with support from 3iS, recorded 300,066 people displaced in the first three quarters of 2025. In addition, at least 2.8 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants live in the country. Colombia is also a strategic point on migratory routes to the south of the continent, especially in territories with limited institutional capacities to respond to this phenomenon and where a high risk of cases of human

¹¹ [Panorama de Desplazamiento Interno Forzado en Honduras Enero – septiembre 2025](#), NRC, 2025.

¹² [Familias hondureñas separadas por deportaciones de ICE: “Nunca había vivido algo así”](#), RFI, 23 January 2026.

¹³ [Desplazamiento interno y otras situaciones de violencia en contextos de criminalidad organizada en América Latina – Informe de monitoreo de protección](#), DRC, NRC and Encuentros, July–October 2025

¹⁴ [UNHCR Ecuador: Operational Update | 2025 in Review](#), UNHCR, 27 January 2026.

¹⁵ [Desplazados por la violencia criminal: la crisis humanitaria invisible en América Latina](#), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), 19 January 2026.

¹⁶ [Crisis en Colombia](#), UNHCR, 2025.

¹⁷ [Colombia Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan Update - Summary \[EN/ES\]](#), OCHA, 22 January 2025.

trafficking, sexual exploitation, and recruitment of children and adolescents, among others, is reported.¹⁸

In January 2025, at least 270,000 people who had appointments in the U.S. with the now defunct CBP One App,¹⁹ were forced to remain in **Mexico**.²⁰ The country is making efforts to ensure international protection for people in need. However, despite the normative commitment and relevant institutional efforts, the saturation of the asylum system and the budget cuts to COMAR²¹ and humanitarian aid limit effective access to rights. The main asylum seekers are Haitian (a third), Honduran (a third), followed by Cuban and Venezuelan, among others. In 2025, 70,552 new asylum applications were registered, 45% from women and 55% from men.²² Mexico also faces an internal situation of violence that has led to more than 260,000 displacements²³. Five states in the country have laws that protect internally displaced persons, however, there is no law at the federal level despite previous efforts in Congress. There is an urgent need for national recognition of this phenomenon to ensure laws that protect those fleeing for their lives.

The situation in **Venezuela** has been, in the last decade, one of the largest displacement crises in the world. Almost 8 million people have left their country of origin, and around 7 million of them are being hosted by countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.²⁴ In December 2025, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants expressed concern about the various ways in which xenophobia manifests and spreads, influencing migration policies and the treatment of migrants.²⁵ Today, it is still essential to avoid narratives that suggest favorable conditions for "voluntary" or safe returns when reality still presents significant risks for the safeguarding of people's integrity, in addition to uncertainty. In this context, it is essential that States, international community avoid promoting or facilitating premature returns that could jeopardize the security and rights of forcibly displaced, ensuring that any return process strictly complies with the principle of voluntariness, security and dignity.

¹⁸ [*Informe revela desafíos humanitarios entre la migración inversa de Costa Rica, Panamá y Colombia.*, Oficina del Alto Comisionado para los Derechos Humanos – América Central, 29 August 2025.](#)

¹⁹ [*CBP Home Mobile Application*, U.S. Customs and Border Protection \(CBP\)](#)

²⁰ [*Por cierre de CBP One hay 270 mil migrantes varados en México*, Rafael López Méndez, 21 January 2025](#)

²¹ [*Análisis de las implicaciones del proyecto de Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación 2026 en materia de derechos humanos de las personas en movilidad humana*, IMUMI, 8 October 2025.](#)

²² [*Information obtained through the transparency system, folio 340011500000926*, Gobierno de México](#)

²³ [*Desplazamiento forzado interno*, Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos \(CNDH\), 30 January 2026.](#)

²⁴ [*Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, R4V*](#)

²⁵ [*La Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, el Comité de Protección de Derechos de los Trabajadores Migratorios y sus familiares, y el Relator Especial sobre los derechos humanos de los migrantes: los Estados deben erradicar la xenofobia en contra de las personas migrantes*, OHCHR, 18 December 2025.](#)

Regarding **Cuba**, this country faces a severe energy crisis, generating electricity cuts, rising food prices, and greater pressure on essential services. This situation was aggravated by the impact of Hurricane Melissa, (which left 2.2 million people affected),²⁶ and is further aggravated by the impact of the new measures from the U.S to block fuel supplies to the island. This scenario is reflected in the region with an **increase of more than 140% in asylum applications from Cubans in Latin America and the Caribbean.**²⁷

And beyond these cases, there are less visible countries that face dynamics of violence and organized crime that require greater regional and global attention before they begin to generate mass displacement. Examples of this include Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Brazil, and the Caribbean.

In parallel, the region is facing an increase in returns, both voluntary and forced, of people who had reached their destination country or were in transit. Many of them return to contexts where the same causes that motivated their flight persist or have even worsened, including violence, persecution, and territorial control exercised by armed actors. Returnees frequently face stigmatization, risks of reprisals, secondary displacement, and significant barriers to accessing documentation, basic services, and reintegration opportunities. The absence of pre-return risk assessments and the lack of comprehensive reintegration programmes with a protection approach increase the likelihood of further displacement and the repetition of cycles of forced mobility, with particularly severe impacts on children, adolescents and women. Although deportations from the United States are not new, the recent practice of deportations to third countries has added to this scenario, deepening the vulnerabilities and protection risks for those affected.

When not accompanied by robust procedural safeguards and individualized risk assessments, these practices can undermine the principle of non-refoulement and create chains of secondary displacement, with particularly serious consequences for children, adolescents and women.

Advances and barriers to protection

Several Latin American and Caribbean States continue to show notable and commendable legal commitment, reflected in the widespread adoption of the Cartagena Declaration,²⁸ which broadens the definition of refugee and recognizes the predominant causes of displacement on the continent. However, significant challenges remain in translating this normative leadership into administrative practices and public policies that ensure a consistent application of the extended definition. In practice, many people who meet the Cartagena criteria are not being recognised as refugees, limiting their access to rights and their long-term stability.

While some States have benefited millions of people through regularization mechanisms, several have been withdrawn in recent years. These efforts have benefited millions of people

²⁶ [Latinoamérica y El Caribe Resumen de Situación Semanal al 6 de febrero 2026, OCHA, 6 February 2026.](#)

²⁷ [Displaced Cubans in the Americas - January 2026, UNHCR, 7 January 2026.](#)

²⁸ [Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, 22 November 1984.](#)

and provided access to documentation and basic services. However, it is essential that these mechanisms are resumed to guarantee opportunities for access and legal stay, although most of them remain temporary in nature that can generate uncertainty for the people hosted and, sometimes, be easily revocable. In some contexts, there is also a tendency to prioritize regularization processes over asylum procedures, even when there are clear needs for international protection, reinforcing the importance of both systems being complementary rather than substitutes.

At the same time, significant obstacles remain to ensure effective access to asylum. Documentary barriers and high indirect costs to initiate procedures are observed in several countries, as well as strict or additional requirements to those contemplated in national regulations that may discourage or prevent access to protection. Although legal frameworks for protection exist, their implementation is limited by delays, lack of accessible information, absence of legal support, and procedures that do not always prioritize protection guarantees. In addition, the militarization of borders in some countries may reinforce a focus on migration control, making it more difficult to file asylum claims. It is important to prioritize group-based decisions and facilitate the reception of asylum applications in border areas.

The lack of legal support constitutes a critical obstacle: persons in need of international protection may receive unjustified negative decisions or abandon processes due to lack of understanding. In this scenario, asylum may become an "available but unattainable" right. Faced with these constraints, many people opt for migratory regularization pathways, when available, which, while offering temporary protection, do not always guarantee safeguards against refoulement or long-term stability. Limitations on access to asylum or regularization increase the risks to the life and integrity of individuals and their families.

Even in contexts where there is political will and institutional advances, such as in Mexico, national asylum systems face growing demand, limited resources, and insufficient operational capacities to adequately respond to protection needs.

Statelessness

In terms of statelessness, the region requires a broader approach that includes countries and populations that are traditionally less visible. Haitians and their descendants constitute the largest and most documented group at risk of statelessness in the region. The **Dominican Republic** has between 500,000 and one million people of Haitian origin in its territory, many of them in an irregular situation.²⁹ The situation in **Nicaragua** is a recent and serious example of how state decisions can produce statelessness: in February 2023, the government banished and stripped 222 people of their nationality, followed days later by another 94 people abroad, leaving them in a condition of de facto statelessness. Since then, the pattern has intensified: between February 2023 and September 2024, at least 452 Nicaraguans were arbitrarily deprived of their nationality³⁰. The lack of documents from the country of birth, apostilles, the inability to cover shipping costs, or the difficulty of registering

²⁹ [World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Dominican Republic: Haitians, Minority Rights Group International, May 2018.](#)

³⁰ [Nicaragua: CIDH repudia la privación arbitraria de nacionalidad de las 135 personas excarceladas, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights \(IACHR\), 13 September 2024; Instituciones y personas responsables de los principales patrones de violaciones y abusos de los derechos humanos y crímenes perpetrados en Nicaragua desde abril de 2018, Grupo de Expertos en Derechos Humanos sobre Nicaragua, 3 April 2025](#)

births in the host country generate losses of rights that can last a lifetime. Legal assistance is key to preventing this situation and breaking cycles of exclusion. UNHCR, as an agency with a specific mandate for the prevention and reduction of statelessness, plays a key role in providing technical support to States to ensure durable solutions, prevent new situations of statelessness and ensure effective access to documentation and nationality.

Internal displacement

Internal displacement has increased in several countries in the region, however, with the exception of **Colombia and Honduras**, no country formally recognizes forced internal displacement in their territories. Despite the progress made in **Ecuador**, and the experiences of some states in **Mexico**, regional challenges remain in countries that suffer or have historically suffered from high rates of internal displacement. **El Salvador**, despite having a law on internal displacement, is still unable to implement it because it lacks regulations, and in **Guatemala**³¹, two years after a legislative initiative on forced displacement was presented, Congress has not yet made progress in its approval.

The recognition of internal displacement represents significant progress in addressing it, since it empowers States to generate public policies that create specific mechanisms for humanitarian assistance, allows the allocation of resources for the creation of programs, plans and initiatives directly aimed at affected populations, creates authorities specialized in the prevention of displacement and care in all its phases and gives existing ones responsibilities to strengthen the available responses. The prolonged lack of regulatory frameworks maintains the structural barriers to access to basic services that aggravate the humanitarian situation of displaced populations (such as humanitarian aid per se, housing, land or property, health or education, among others), which condemn them to exclusion and new cycles of violence that put the life and integrity of the population at risk.

Regional protection cooperation mechanisms

Regional mechanisms - such as the Quito Process, MIRPS and Cartagena+40 through its Chile Plan of Action - have played an important role at different times, contributing to strengthening coordination and dialogue on protection. However, in the current context, they face challenges in fully reflecting the changing displacement dynamics and most pressing protection needs, in addition to persistent challenges related to financing. Some key areas require renewed attention, offering an opportunity to update and expand their agendas in ways that reflect the current flow dynamics and the emergence of new destination countries, phenomena driven largely by recent changes in US migration policies and, to a lesser extent, from other countries in the region.

At the same time, certain processes show signs of slowing down. Chile's Plan of Action, which emerged in the framework of the 40th anniversary of the Cartagena Declaration and was adopted in late 2024 with the aim of reinvigorating regional commitments on protection and cooperation, could face challenges in its implementation due to recent changes in leadership and more restrictive approaches towards displaced persons³².

³¹ According to the National Institute of Statistics and the UNHCR, by 2025 the number of displaced people in Guatemala amounts to 1.2 million people. [EL INE y ACNUR presentaron datos sobre Desplazamiento Interno en Guatemala](#), Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), 4 September 2025.

³² [Chile carries out first deportation flight as part of new migration plan](#), Reuters, 16 April 2026

The Quito Process has also progressed at a slower pace than in previous years. In previous cycles, draft action plans had been available since the beginning of the year. In this context, we encourage Panama, in its capacity as pro tempore presidency, to exercise constructive leadership that prioritizes the protection of persons in vulnerable situations, including the prevention of practices such as the receipt of deportations from third countries of non-Panamanian citizens, which in the past generated concern.³³ Likewise, the process of the Declaration of Los Angeles, in past years promised to make progress towards a hemispheric approach to migration, but due to political changes progress has stalled.

At a time when several States are reviewing their migration policies and discourses that promote returns or deportations are reemerging, it is essential to preserve and strengthen regional protection-oriented spaces, avoiding measures that could affect people who already face high risks.

Humanitarian and protection responses

The continuity of the humanitarian and protection response is also at risk. States have the primary responsibility to ensure the protection of displaced persons and persons in need of international protection. However, when national systems face limitations or are unable to fully respond to existing needs, civil society, grassroots organizations, refugee- and displaced-led organizations (RLOs), and local actors continue to play a critical role within their capacities, providing access to information, assistance, and accompaniment.

Despite being closest to communities and often the most effective responders – because of their direct links, knowledge of the context and sustained access – local organizations receive only about 7% of global humanitarian funding, well below the 25% commitment made in the *Grand Bargain*³⁴. **In addition, funding cuts and conditionalities of new funding modalities, especially from the United States, are critically reducing the ability of these actors to sustain their work.** In many border areas, these organizations often represent the first and sometimes only line of protection available to displaced persons. Further weakening would have severe and immediate humanitarian consequences.

Recommendations

To States:

- **Strengthen national asylum systems throughout the region, promoting fair, efficient, and accessible procedures aligned with international standards**, and secure the necessary political commitment so that the legal frameworks and legal obligations already adopted are fully implemented and translated into coherent and effective practices.
- **Expand complementary pathways for protection and alternatives for long-term legal stay**, guaranteeing full access to documentation and rights, and promoting flexible regularization mechanisms that reduce barriers related to deadlines, costs, and identity documentation requirements.
- **Recognize internal displacement caused by violence as a humanitarian and protection emergency requiring immediate and coordinated responses**, beginning with full legal recognition. **In countries that do not yet have legislation,**

³³ [US/Panama: Mass Expulsion of Third-Country Nationals](#), Human Rights Watch, 24 April 2025.

³⁴ [Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2025, ALNAP, 16 June 2025](#)

adopt and consolidate national regulatory frameworks and policies for prevention, protection and care for displaced and returnees with protection needs in their communities of origin. **In countries that already have laws on internal displacement**, ensure their regulation and the necessary budgetary allocation to ensure their effective implementation and avoid remaining only on paper.

- **Strengthen and preserve regional protection coordination, ensuring coherent and complementary responses** and the systematic exchange of information and best practices.
- **Update and harmonize existing regional mechanisms** – including the Quito Process, MIRPS, and Chile's Plan of Action – so that they reflect current displacement dynamics and prioritize the most vulnerable populations, while ensuring **effective articulation with spaces for dialogue with civil society and refugee- and displaced-led organizations (RLOs)** prior to the approval of any action plan.
- **Ensure that any return, whether to the country of origin or to a third country, is based on prior risk assessments, conducted with the participation of protection, child and human rights authorities, and with access to legal assistance and interpretation**, ensuring that decisions respect the principle of non-refoulement and are only taken when the causes of displacement have effectively ceased. These processes must be voluntary, dignified and safe, and have mechanisms that guarantee the socioeconomic integration and psychosocial care of returned or deported persons, including post-return monitoring and accompaniment.
- **Strengthen mechanisms for identifying, preventing, and responding to statelessness**, as well as those facing arbitrary denial or deprivation of identity and nationality documentation by their States of origin.
- **Guarantee effective access to the territory and to asylum procedures at all points of entry** (borders, airports, and checkpoints), prohibiting rejections at borders without an individual assessment of protection needs, and ensure free and specialized legal assistance for asylum seekers, especially in border areas and places of detention. Likewise, **avoid the use of immigration detention or other measures** that limit the freedom of movement of persons in need of international protection, promoting alternatives consistent with their protection needs.
- **Recognize and strengthen the self-organizing dynamics of refugee communities by supporting refugee- and displaced-led organizations (ROs)**, ensuring their meaningful, sustained, and effective participation in the processes of designing, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating public policies and protection mechanisms, **while promoting the direct participation of affected people in decisions that affect them**, in line with the practical guide of the Jakarta Independent Declaration.

To UNHCR:

- **Leverage the framework of Chile's Plan of Action to position internal displacement as a regional priority**. Internal displacement must be at the forefront of the agenda of the OAS and the IDB, ensuring that it is recognized as a challenge of regional stability and not just an internal problem of each country.
- **Promote meaningful, structured and continuous participation of civil society organizations** and those led by refugees and displaced persons (RLOs) in the monitoring and implementation processes of Chile's Plan of Action, as well as in the consultation spaces of the Executive Committee and other UNHCR governance mechanisms.

- **Advance national normative frameworks on internal displacement aligned with the UN Guiding Principles**, and strengthen both technical assistance and implementation to close the gap between norm and practice across the region.
- **Accompany the strengthening of national asylum systems**, with attention to emerging needs from 2025 onwards.
- **Support States in updating and harmonizing regional protection mechanisms**, promoting frameworks that are more coherent, complementary and aligned with current displacement dynamics, diversity of countries of origin, new destination countries and most urgent protection risks – while supporting local and community actors, especially in the face of funding cuts that weaken the first line of protection.
- **Strengthen public and systematic monitoring of return and deportation processes in the region** - including transfers to third countries - complemented by post-return tracking programmes and early warning systems on secondary displacement risks and issuing clear technical guidance to States to prevent violations of the principle of non-refoulement.

To international donors:

- **Prioritize the financing of response programs that mitigate and address protection risks** and that, through **transnational strategies** adapted to the new dynamics of forced displacement in the region, guarantee essential services such as legal and psychosocial support, livelihoods, health, education and housing, land and property so that families can rebuild their life projects with dignity and stability.
- **Effectively advance the commitments made under the Grand Bargain on localization**, ensuring that at least 25% of humanitarian funding reaches local actors and refugee- and displaced-led organizations (RLOs) directly, recognizing their role as a frontline of protection.
- **Prioritize flexible funding for civil society, especially for local and community-based organizations** operating in border and return areas.
- **Support and fund data collection and analysis systems**, including protection monitoring, local and regional analyses of legal aid frameworks, internal displacement registries, and other essential evidence mechanisms to inform public policy and humanitarian responses. Data should be "disaggregated by age, gender, and diversity (AGD)." This is vital so that children and people with disabilities are not invisible in general statistics.
- **Support independent human rights monitoring mechanisms** in return and deportation contexts.